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The years of the Second World War witnessed a revival in the fortunes
of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). At the beginning of
the war the Party's following num"bered less than 300, i t s influence in
the trade unions was negligible, i t was isolated from other poli t ical
organisations among blacks, while i t s efforts with whites had
succeeded neither in checking the growth of fascism or Afrikaner
nationalism nor in building class unity. Six years later the Party
could count i t s adherents in thousands rather than hundreds, i t was
capable of winning white local government elections, and i t s members
presided over the largest-ever African trade union movement as well
as contributing significantly to the leadership of the African and
Indian Congresses. IVom 1945 knowledge of the Party*s development
becomes vital for any understanding of the mainstream of black polit ics
in South Africa, Biie paper will examine and attempt to explain the
wartime expansion in the Communist Party's influence, f i r s t by referring
to the social and economic conditions as well as the overall polit ical
environment of the time, and then by discussing the Party's polioies
and strategies* CPSA responses to three different sets of movements or
organisations will be discussed: movements of the urban poor, of peasants,
and of labour. She paper will conclude with an evaluation of the Party's
role and development during the period.
Economic and social conditions which helped to promote a fresh mood of
popular political assertion and which facilitated the rise in CPSA
popularity have been well documented in the relevant l i terature and
need only brief recapitulation here. For economic historians the 1939-
1945 period represents the concluding part of an industrial boom which
began with South Africa's devaluation in 1932. Between 1936 and I95I
the industrial workforce doubled at an annual growth rate of six per
cent ( I ) . Hhis growth had a particular impact on Africans during the
war because of the diversion: of a quarter of a million whites (2) iato
military occupations. Africans in substantial numbers began to f i l l
semi-skilled positions in factories and here the wartime increase in the
number of black workers was three times that of whites (3), Movement
into semi-3killed positions was one factor contri"fcnrting to the narrow-
ing of the wage gap between black and' white manufacturing workers which
occurred during the war (4)* However the 100 000 extra Afrioan factory
workers recruited during the war (a forty per cent increase in: the
tota l of the African manufacturing labour force) only accounted for
a small proportion of the Rowing urban African population (5)«
Between 1936 and 1946 o f f i c ia l s ta t i s t i c s revealed a virtual doubling
of Johannesburg*s African population to almost 400 000 whilst in
some smaller centres the r ise was even more rapids in Cape 2bwn during
the war the number of African inhabitants grew from about 15 000 to an
estimated total of 60 000. Additional numbers put an impossible
strain-, on the already inadequate provision of housing and the war years
were to see the mushrooming of shanty settlements on the fringes of
every significant town* Many of the people *dxo inhabited these were
refugees from the overcrowded and drougit stricken reserves where
economic conditions at the beginning of the war were beginning to
attract even government concern (6 ) . Hie towns provided harsh havens
for though there was work for some, a l l had to face spiral l ing food
prices (7) (partly the result of heavy grain export commitments) as
well as shortages^ and most lived in conditions of fearsome poverty. In
social and eoonomio terms the war years represented an acceleration and
deepening of changes which had already been in motion for nearly a
decade. But government pol ic ies and the wider po l i t i ca l environment of
the 1939-1945 period were in some respects importantly different from
what preceded and followed the war.
Daring the early years of the war the Government displayed en
uncharacteristic anxiety to secure the support and loyalty of Afrioans.
This concern reached a climax im I942 when the Minister of Native
Affairs, Benys Reits cr i t i c i sed the pass laws and ordered a relaxation
of their application in the main industrial centres of the Transvaal
and Hatal (8 ) . She same year the anit Committee recommended their
abolition vdiile the Minister of Labour, Halter Madeley, opening the
Council of Non-European Trade Unions annual oonferenoe in November,
promised thai; legal reoo^xition of Afrioaa trade unions was impending (9 ) .
Even at th is point any hopeful expectations would have been qualified
by War Measure 145 i&ioh prohibited a l l African strikes and Stouts1 s
repudiation of the relevance to black South Africans of the Atlantic
Charter (10). Nevertheless talk of post-war black amelioration
continued stimulated partly by the energetio efforts of parliamentary
Native Representatives (who included after 1943 a former communist,
Hymen Basner) as well as a flurry of commission recommendations. Tae
State* s overtures to Africans were mainly attri"butable to i t s resolve
to maintain h ig i l eve ls of industrial production and, of course, the
government's feeling of vulnerability at a time of developing polarisation
in white p o l i t i c s .
War "brou^it a change i n vdiite public perceptions of the Communist
Party. From I94I the Soviet Union was a glorious and respected
a l ly (II) (with diplomatic representation in South Africa the following
year) and a series of nation-wide meetings of such groups: as the
friends of the Soviet Union (FSB) and Medioal Aid for Russia were well
attended and well publicised gatherings. Die FSU, unt i l I94I a coterie
of CpSA enthusiasts, by the end of the war included among i t s patrons
the Mayor of Johannesburg and the Minister of Justice (12) . %e eleotion
of S i l l Andrews as Party leader in I943 meant that the CPSA figurehead
was a celebrated veteran of the t&ite labour movement (13). She Party
i n 1942 'became conspicuously patriot ic! for several months i t arranged
'Defend South Africa' r a l l i e s i n town hal l s up and down the country,
i t s newspaper columns gave prominence to war news while the editor
donned an air-raid warden's uniform and conscientiously patrolled the
lanes of Orlando (14). White comrades in the army helped to found a
1
 Springbok Legion*. Even the South African Broadcasting Corporation!
responded to the spirit of the times, A Yiddish choir drawn from the
Jewish Workers1 Club sung the 'International* on the radio and B i l l
Andrews was requested in 1942 to broadcast a May Day message to workers
in-, support of the war effort (I5)»
I t was a complicated time for the Communist Party, In conformity with
Communist Parties in other parts of the world (though not in the British
dominions) the CPSA was to declare the war to be a confl ict between r ival
imperialisms and opposed i t on that ground. Biou^i *in the interests of
humanity* i t was 'essential that Nazism "be destroyed1, for South Africans
th i s could "be done most effectively by confronting the domestic threat
of fascism (16) . In doing this i t was 'chi ldishly absurd* to hope 'that
out of a white population of two million, which i s divided by a deep
cleavage from top to bottom, forces can arise that wi l l save South Africa
£rom fascist onslaught whether from within or without' (17). Hence
the Party's emphasis shifted from popular front act iv i ty among whites
to efforts to mobilise large numbers of black people in anticipation
of a wartime administration's increasingly authoritarian attacks on
•workers and democratic organisations' ( id}* ^ March 1940 in a report
presented at the national conference,the Party's involvement in "the
national struggle of Non-Baropeans' was argued to be essential to the
development of a mass movement to res i s t fascism (19)• h^© Party's
anti—war campaign was therefore most publicly evident in the act ivi ty
of those of i t s members who were already active in the Non-European
United Front (20). Opinion within the Party was not unanimous.
Johannesburg Communists had held the view that the Party should support
an effective prosecution of the war 'before 'being overruled by the
leadership in Cape Eown (21). There was l i t t l e determined dissent
however: an already disil lusioned Hyman Basner chose the Soviet Invasion
of Finland as the occasion to make h i s "break with the Party (22) while
the unpredictable Jimmy La Gama decided, mysteriously, to join up (23) .
I f others had private qualms a*bout, for example, the Nazi-Soviet pact,
they kept them to themselves (24). For *&ile the Party apparently took
i t s cue on the issue of the war from Comintern directives (25), never-
theless opposing the war was local ly popular among certain groups.
Following the precedent set by nationalists in India* radical South Afrioan
Indians were to make opposition to the war their main plank in the ir
effective opposition of the conservative leadership of the Indian
Congresses. Here Indian Com.-nunists involved in the Non-Baropean United
Front were prominent. In Cape Sown John. Goroas writing in f^reedom in
June I94O reflected a common sentiment when he argued:
I am sat is f ied with the statement of the famous Ehglish sc ient i s t
Professor J B S Haldane9 that he would rather be a Jew in Hi t l er ' s
Berlin than a native in Johannesburg,., How can we "be interested in
f i t t i n g Nazism thousands of miles away, while in real i ty we have
a similar monster devouring us here daily? (26)
All this was to change in June 1941 when the German army marched into
Russia. Four days after the invasion the Central Committee produced a
statement arguing that the total character of the war had changed: *The
Soviet Union i s not an imperialist power and i s not waging an imperialist
war'. 55ae Communist Party and the Non-European United Front abandoned
opposition to the war to the Irotskyis'ts whose position remained
unaltered by the attack on Russia. 'Hitlerism', now according to
Inkululeko« the new CPSA nespaper, was an immediate 'threat to the very
hope of advancement and freedom for a l l workers and oppressed peoples'(27)
4South Afrioa should stren^ien i t s contribution to the destruction of
Nazism "by arming "black soldiers and giving "black people the votet 'Give
the people democratic ri^rfcs, give them a country and a decent l i fe ,
give them arms and there ie nothing which they will not do to defend
their freedom and their rights1 urged Inkululeko (28). •Bad as South
Africa i s 1 , wrote Moses Kotane in early 1942 in a pamphlet entitled
Japan* Friend or Foe?« 'she i s as much our home as she is that of the
Europeans •••South Africa is what we Non-Europeans allowed her to be
. . • i n the future she will "be what we ourselves make of her1 (29). With
support for the war effort the Communist Party was once again prepared
to consider constituencies which three years earlier had appeared to "be
lost causes:
Our experience has shown that our Party can gain support and
good will of all sections. We must establish close contact
with Afrikaners • • • We must "build the Party among skilled
workers, (30)
ftie Party's attitude to the war would influence the most vital areas of
i t s activity. For example, in calling for opposition to the government's
War Measure I45> the Central Committee in December 1942 advocated that
the 'trade union movement should get the Government to withdraw this
measure* and 'demand* full recognition of African Trade Unions. Just
how the trade unions should add force to these demands was not spelt out
thou^i the statement went on to suggest that *in the interests of South
Africa's well "being, particularly in these serious times, every effort
should "be made to avoid strikes1 (3X). In I942 the Party's posture also
seemed to shape the attitude of the authorities to i t . As mentioned
above Bill Andrews was given time on the SABC to "broadcast a May Day
message calling for the solidarity of la*bour against Hitler and a subversion
charge was dropped against Kotane after the Minister of Justice was shown
a copy of his pamphlet Japan, Sfriend or Foe? (32).
i s l i t t l e published information on Party activity during most of
i t s anti-war phase. During 1939 and I940 the Party did not publish a
newspaper (33) and sympathetic historians tend to limit their discussion
to Yusaf Dadoo's activities on "behalf of the Non-Europeans United lyont.
The Front organised a series of anti-war ral l ies and Dadoo himself was
imprisoned for four months after making an eloquent and powerful ease
against the war at his t r ial (34)» ^ e Front's opposition to the war,
though, did not take i t into the strikes and "boycotts contemplated at i t s
original inception (35)» S&© African National Congress also provided a
focus for activity "by African communists: J B Harks f irst transferred
most of his energies to ANC work after "being expelled from the Party in
the late 1930s (36) and Moses Kotane, general secretary and full-time
functionary from 1939 onwards, led a revival of the ANC in Cape Sfcwn.
Die Johannesburg District Conference in i t s review of the previous year's
work acknowledged in Maxell 1941 the 'great importance attached to helping
the ANC lead the African people in their struggle1 (37) thou^i in the same
year the Party conference warned that commitments to other organisations
were causing a neglect of the Party i tself (38). In fact i t i s difficult
to see a strong central impulse to the CPSA's development in this period:
a modest and rather late beginning was made in the field of African
Erade Union aotivity and some support was given to Alphaeus Maliba's
pioneering attempts to organise peasant resistance in the Northern
Transvaal; African members contested and won two and then three seats
on the Orlando Adviso:ry Board elections while in Johannes"burg Communists
continued their weekly public meetings on the City Hall steps. Here also
i t was hoped to gain through the Party's anti-war stance some Afrikaner
support with the establishment of of an Afrikaans medium journal,
Ware Republike_in« though the Party continued to stress the reactionary
oharacter of Afrikaner Nationalism {39)• A modest growth in membership
was recorded, from 280 to 400, a new District Committee was elected in
Johannesburg in 1940 composed largely of men and women who had Joined the
Party quite recently and were thus unaffected by the divisions and
tensions of i t s sectarian history in the 1930s, and a new constitution as
drawn up in 1941. Reconstruction of the Party after the debil i tations
of the previous decade seems to have "been the main priority; anti—war
aotivity did not extend "beyond public meetings. Ulds notwithstandingf
three communists were interned: the Joffe brothers of Johannesburg and
the trade unionist Arnold Latti from Port Elizabeth. I t i s possible
that the anti-war l ine did not inspire much enthusiasm within the Party;
According to Edwin Mofutsanyana this period:
(was) the time when the Africans began asking whether
they (the Communists) were supporters of Hit ler . 2hey
had phrases l ike *wamphethu Mkize1 - 'Hitler has got them
al l r i g i t ' . (40)
Perhaps significantly in this context, one of the resolutions debated
at the May I94I conference, when the Party was s t i l l opposing the war,
concerned the rights of African servicemen? they should be ent i t led to
bear arms and to gain: probation to a l l army ranks (41)* 3here was an
essential ambivalence to the Party's anti-war positions even i t s most
militant exponent, Yusuf Dadoo qualif ied h i s opposition with the
proviso that i f 'unfettered democratic rigrfcs* were extended to black
people than the conflict could be transformed into a .'just war1 which
i t would be possible to support (42)•
Such considerations no longer applied after the Soviet entry into the
war though there ware some noisy objections to the Party's rationalisation.
of i t s new position (43). In April 1942 the Communists launched a. 'Defend
South Africa' campaign-. 9his was to take the form of approximately
thirty open air and city hall meetings, pageants and processions held in
every major town and several smaller centres as well: Johannesburg, Durban,
East London, Port ELizabeth, Cape Town, Kimberley, Bloerafontein, Pretoria,
Pietermaritzberg, Ladysmith, Dundee and Roodepoort were a l l v i s i ted t y
leading party spokesmen, black and white, cal l ing upon the government to
•Avenge ^bbruk, by mobilising our people and our wealth*. Ohe public
intentions of the oampaign were spelt out in a lengthy pamphlet, Arm the
People , thousands of copies of which were distributed during the eigjit
months 'of i t s duration. Arm the People, opened with a reference to the
threat of invasion from Vichyite Madacascar: the 'Fascist peri l 1 was
•approaching ever closer to our shores' and South Africa was 'faced with
a desperate struggle for i t s existence*. After c r i t i c i s i n g the government
for i t s neglect of adequate military training for blacks, i t s tolerance
of the Ossewa Brandwag and similar components of a 'Fifth Column*, and i t s
continued diversion of national resources into gold production the
pamphlet went on: to outline 'A Policy for Victory'. Black soldiers should
be armed and army conditions improved so as to encoittrage recruitment.
Inuustry should be put on a war footing with the establishment of workers*
production committees to increase output, protect workers' interests and
prevent sabotage. African trade unions should be recognised and encouraged
and African workers allowed to acquire s k i l l s . The pass laws and segregation
laws should go and voting r i^ i t s should be extended to blacks. Adequate
air raid precautions were needed. Food supplies should be improved
throu^i aid to small farmers and the abolition of control boards which
functioned to maintain hi^i agricultural prices (44). I f the underlying
motive of the campaign was to "broaden the Party* 3 appeal then i t can
be judged as a success. A recruiting drive for membership was mounted
simultaneously and application forms were distributed at public meetings*
Each district or "branch was set recruiting quotas; Durban was apparently
the most successful in 'bringing new people into the Party (45)- Ey the end
of the campaign membership had quadrupled with I 346 new adherents (4*>)»
£5 000 had been donated to party funds and the circulation of the by 1943
communist-controlled Guardian newspaper had risen to 42 000 (47)» In
i t s public pronouncements the Party provided no indication, as to among
which sections of the population i t was most successful in building a
following at this time. While city hall meetings would have been primarily
directed at whites many of the events were arranged in; locations habitually
used by black people and Afrioan speakers commonly provided keynote
addresses. Jroro later estimates i t seems likely that a large proportion
of the recruits were African and Indian(48)»This may have been as much
an effect of the Party's attention to local community issues and black
trade unionisn as of the specific content of the campaign itself.
But if, as the Simonses claim,it i s possible to discern in the Defend
South Africa Campaign a programme for "complete liberation from national
oppression1 (49) this was'not the main emphasis in the CPSAfs appeals to
voters in parliamentary and municipal elections the following year. Bie
Party's intention to contest white elections, something i t had not
contemplated since the 1920s (50) was signalled by Kotane at the concluding
Defend South Africa rally when he announced a forthcoming new initiative
fto increase our influence, to press forward with our demands1 (51) •
Another pamphlet was produced. Entitled *We South Africans* and aimed
at potential white voters in the 1943 general election i t was studiously
vague in discussing the GpSAfs approach to African political aspirations.
Referring to the Labour Party's • total segregation* policy i t suggested:
Africans themselves may prefer such a system under socialism}
i t bears some resemblance to the fautonomous national republics1
that have been reoo^iised in Soviet Russia and may be a progress-
ive step under socialism. But i t i s a very long term policy;
the practical question of today i s how to remove the disabilities
imposed on the non-\iiite peoples. (52)
She pamphlet also argued that skilled white workers to protect their own
long term interests should set about removing racial job reservation
as well as contending that socialism would benefit 'members of the profess-
ions, artists and scientists, shopkeepers and small farmers1 (53).
She Party1 s nine parliamentary candidates garnered 7 000 votes between
them, an average of II per cent of the vote. An Bast Londoner, Archie
Muller, supported by African voters was narrowly defeated in the Cape
Provincial elections. Ohe same year the Party's electoral efforts were
rewarded with two seats on the Cape 2bwn City Council and one on Bast
London's (54)» I t was an encouraging start . The other left-wing
contender in the general election, the Independent Labour Party, despite
i t s well-known leader Solly Sachs and a prudent 'bread and butter1
manifesto collected only 2 per cent of the votes in the three working
class constituencies i t contested (55)• Heartened by i t s modest success
the Party continued to fi@tt elections: in 1944 Hilda Watts won a council
seat in Hillbrow, a central Johannesburg suburb of high density apartment
blocks and two further seats were gained in Cape Ibwn.
Research is needed to te l l us why the CPSA was able to win elections as
well as to indicate the extent to which i t tailored i t s propaganda to the
prejudices and inclinations of white voters. Referring to the 1945
municipal elections in Johannes"burg an Inkululeko correspondent
reported on the fdisappearance of old prejudices against communists' (56)
and the shook he encountered amongst white suburban voters fat the
horror of non-Buxopeajr conditions . . . (they) nearly always agree that
improvements should be made1* •Ihe voters are waking up',. he concluded,
'and we communists, "by fighting the elections, are helping them to see
the truth1 . Biou^i the CpSA's electoral appeal may have "been defined
in a way which could evoke social compassion i t is also possible that
i t moderated the politioal and social implications of i t s policies*
Support for the 'national democratic revolution1 was frequently presented
as merely the extension of civil rights to blacks. Bnphasis on this
detracted from the socialist content of the Party's message:
Comrades, there are times when to be extreme ul t ra-
revolutionary i s to betray the cause for whioh we are
working. Which is the more revolutionary today - to say
you want to nationalise the land and nationalise the
banks, or to say you want the vote and equality of rights
for the non-Europeans. (57)
In January I944 the CPSA removed from i t s constitution the clause which
determined as one of the Party's principal aims 'the abolition of
Imperialism and the establishment of an independent republic of the
people1. I t sought to reassure the white public ini other ways too.
Social equality between black and white would not necessitate the
the abandonment of customary social segregation. A communist pamphlet
published in 1945 dwelt on a familiar preoocupation in white electoral
politics*
One who thinks a black man is sorry and ashamed of his
colour i s stupid ...We love our colour and we would not
like to decrease i t by inter-marriage $ we like our black
girls dearly and wish them to marry and increase our
black raoe. One who says we blacks might take European
girls for marriage if we were freed talks rubbish. (58)
Qhe Party's moderation in i t s public stance did not immunise i t from
attack. In Johannesburg the Labour Party having refused on two occasions
the Communists' offer of an electoral pact published a leaflet in the
1945 election on what the Communist Party stood for. The leaflet detailed
the CPSA's advocacy of universal suffrage and i t s espousal of the r i^ i t
of blacks to stand for election in addition to i t s desire for 'natives
and ooloureds (to be allowed to)ride in the same "buses and live in the
same residential areas as Europeans'. As Irjcululeko plaintively pointed
out the leaflet 'said nothing at all about the constructive municipal
policy advanced by the communists' (59)*
While trying to garner electoral support from whites the CPSA was also
systematically attempting to "build i t s following among blacks. In
November 1943 following a vigorous return to pass law enforcement by
the police on the Witwatersrand (60) an Anti-Pass conference was held
in Johannesburg under the auspices of the CPSA, J^ om a platform decorated
with a huge portrait of Johannes Kkosi, the Durban communist martyr of
the 1930 pass campaign, and festooned with'Mayibuye I Afrika1 banners, the
assembly was opened try speeches from Tusuf Badoo and Edwin Mofutsanyana.
Bxe time had come, said Dr Dadoo 'for the Non-Buropean people to unite (
to raise their voioe and carry on a campaign) against the pass laws,
against this badge of slavery which humiliates the African people1. 'We
are not alone', he continued*
8If we campaign properly and well, we will win the support of
the Coloured and Indian people, and of the progressive Europeans.
The time had come, exhorted Mofutsanyana 'to f i^i t the passes to the "bitter
end1. !Ihis should "be done by employing 'every channel that we have':
We must petition the government and t e l l them we can no longer
tolerate their pass laws. We must t e l l our representatives in
Parliament that in the coming session they must move a "bill to
abolish the pass laws. (62)
After the chairman had enjoined those 'who had nothing special to say not
to speak1 a pledge of support was taken "by the 153 delegates (from 112
"bodies representing 80 796 people) who then resolved to set up local
anti-pass ooramittees,send resolutions to the Prime Minister, Minister for
Native Affairs, and the Native Representative Council and as well as
requesting the parliamentary native representatives to introduce anti-pass
legislation 'to undertake every possible form of aotivity which will "bring
pressure on the Government to abolish the pass laws1. A leading committee
of 15 was then elected composed largely of African communists and non-
communist members of the Transvaal African National Congress (63).
She formation , of local anti-pass committees rapidly got under way.
By May 1944 when an ela"borate launching ceremony was held for the campaign
in Johannesburg anti-pass activity had spread to affect most substantial
Afrioan urban communities In the Transvaal: Brakpan, Roodepoort, Randfontein,
Middelturg, Wifbank, Springs, Vereeniging, Meyer ton, Klerks dorp, Ermelo, and
Pretoria, Anti-pass oomraittees existed in Pieters"burg and Sibasa in the
Northern Iransvaal. Work had "begun in Cape Iowa where the Anti-Pass Committee
held during January meetings in Langa, Retreat, Kensington, Bellevue,
Philipi and Stellenbosoh. Meetings were usually arranged in conjunction
with looal "bodies: vigilance associations, tenants leagues as well as
A8G "branches and trade unions. By April 1944 local efforts were focused
on the circulation of a petition and the selling of green, yellow and
"black anti-pass "badges. A somewhat "belated endorsement of the campaign
came in March from Dr Xuma, President-General of the AUC (64).
The campaigns was formally inaugurated in Johannesburg on the weekend of
May 20th - 2Ist# 540 delegates attended a meeting at Gandhi Hall representing
a diversity of organisations: trade unions, vigilance associations, food
olu"bs, AKC and CPSA "branches, churches, student groups, Advisory Boards,
and Ratepayers' Associations. After addresses "by Dr Xuma, the Rev. Michael
Scott, Dr Ismail of the Indian Congress and the Native Representative
Council members a National Anti-Pass Council was elected. Bie form of the
campaign was confirmed: a million signature petition for presentation to
the government in August, fundraising, and the distritrution of publicity
material, T^otskyite advocacy of more militant forms of resistance were
rejected "by the delegates and subsequently Inkululeko's columnist; fUmlweli,
reproved-those \dio were arguing in favour of civil disobedience by the
Anti-Pass leadership:this was foolish for the task of leaders was 'to assist
and give guidance' (65). IJie olimax of the launch was provided by a
demonstration of 20 000 throu^i the streets of Johannesburg. Pew people,
thou^i, were there to witness i t , for i t was a Sunday.
In June and July the campaign seemed to progressing well. In Brakpan
(home of the APC's secretary, David Bopape )tables were 3et up in the
streets and by the gates of the location with copies of the petition
for people to sign. A thousand men and vnmen gathered in Sibasa, their
num"bers including several local chiefs and indunas. A request for 200
petition forms came from the recently established committee in Bloemfontein.
In Heidelberg in June, after the arrest of a leading local communist and
member of the Anti-Pass Committee, Dan Mokeana, for not having a lodger's
permit, hundreds of women demonstrated outside the court—room while schools
closed and ir* one went to work. After a parada throu^i the centre of the
town the mayor listened to a l i s t of complaints against the location
superintendent and promised the release of Mokeana. The superintendent
himself was arrested the following week under suspicion of attempting to
excite sympathy "by* placing a "bomb in his own office.®6 Meanwhile further
meetings were reported in Durban-, Boksburg, Cape 2bwn and Springs,
In August however the tempo of the campaign appeared to slacken.
in Srakpan on August 10 there was a stay away ty 7 000 African location^
residents in protest against the dismissal from his teaching post of
David Bopape (67) there were no reports of activity connected with
opposition to passes from anywhere else ia the Transvaal. In September
i t was announced that the date for the presentation of the petition had
been postponed (68),
next public pronotaicement of the National Anti-Pass Council did not
come until Fetoiary. Biis was a statement by Bbpape on the closure of
the petition drive (69). Angered by the silences in Bopape's statement
two communist members of the Council . , Mofutsanyana and Palmer made
public criticisms of i t s work. In the Transvaal the campaigns
. - • became inactive after the (Kay) Conference, Badges were
not sold, petitions were not signed, and even the local
committees have gone to sleep • ••something i s radically wrong
with the working committees. Most of the Council members
at the centre failed to attend meetings* there has been an
average attendance of from five to seven; the work being left
to three members «««it must be pointed out that Chairman
(Dadoo) and the Secretary (Bopape) have not been the live
wires they should have been* 3iey have rather eipected local
committees and others to take the init iative. (70)
'She conclusion of the campaign- was in June 1945* 5 000 people accompanied
a deputations to present the petition to the Deputy Prime Minister. On
arriving at Parliament i t s leaders were refused an interview with Hoftaeyr
and rejected the offer of meetings with the Ministers of Native Affairs and
Justice. 3he government made no public response to the petition and i t s
100 000 signatures*
What had gone wrong? At the beginning there seemed to be no shortage of
popular enthusiasm for the campaign. Large numbers of people apparently
participated in demonstrations, on local iniatives passes were actually
"burnt on oertain occasions (71), and in at least two centres, Brakpan
and Heidelberg^ the issue of the pass laws fused with other sources of
local discontent to provoke impressive displays of communal solidarity (72),
On. the Bast Rand women- were noticeably involved in the early stages of the
oampaigoi «• in March 1944 at the instigation of Josie Palmer a special
women's conference was held in Johannesburg - and the war years did witness
an effort by some municipalities to regulate for the f irst time the
movement of African women into town.
It is possible that the form the campaign took did l i t t l e to retain people's
interest and active support: contrasted with earlier types of protest
against the pass laws petitioning was rather a lame taotio — hardly the
conceivable limit 'of activity which will bring pressure on the Government'.
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Of course i t i s possible as the critics quoted above suggested that
leaders could have "been more energetic (though i t should "be acknowledged
that both Dadoo and Bopape were harassed by the authorities as a result
of their part in the campaign) "but that seems unsatisfactory "by itself as
an explanation. Contemporary commentators suggested that the CPSA
deliberately confined the protest to legal sorts of activity as a
consequence of i t s war policy (73)* In addition i t may have been that
communists themselves may have been influenced "by government proposals for
reform to the extent of believing that if they campaigned 'properly and
well1 the authorities would have, "been suitably impressed.
ELeationa and national campaigns were only one dimension of the Party's
wartime developments Before attempting any overall evaluation of i t s
role i t s more localised responses and activities and i t s work in- the
trade union movement need consideration*
Before1 the war in the Iransvaal there were two geographical foouses to
CPSA aotivity among Africans, fflie first was in Orlando where from 1934
Communists had dominated Advisory Board politics organising support for
their candidates through the Vigilance Association. The Communists recognised
from the beginning the limitations of the Boards (74)but argued that they should
should be employed as platforms for a 'mighty struggle for self-government in
the locations' to be conducted not only through the boards themselves but
also outside them*
If the municipality and the Government does not listen to
the Advisory Board members when they put forward your
just demands, the Advisory Board members must call meetings
of residents, lead deputations and demonstrations and compel
the rulers to fulfill these demands, Ihe Advisory Board
members must be real leaders and fi^itera for your demands (75)-
After 1937 though there was an additional dimension to the CPSA's view
of Board politics for the Boards themselves were vital constituents in
the process of indirect election of representatives to the Native
Representative Council. 3be CPSA's own NEC candidate, Edwin Mofutsanyana,
was a leading figure in Orlando Advisory Board activity. Ascetic and
hardworking, 'loyal Edwin' (7*0 lacked the popular touchj Communist
influence in Orlando depended more on organisational efficiency than on
charismatic local personalities.
Communists were active also in Alexandra, the freehold township to the north
of Johannesburg. In Eram Fischer the Party had a representative on the
Health Committee, nominally the governing local authority in Alexandra and
a substantial looal branch had been built through the efforts of Max Joffe
who during the late 1930s was locally active in setting up a tenants1 league.
Alexandra and Orlando provided the settings for two of the most dramatic
assertions of popular discontent during the war and ostensibly the CPSA
might have appeared well plaoed in both cases to have played a leading
role. In Alexandra between 1940 and 1945 there were four seperate protests
over rises in bus fares. They took the form of boycotts which climaxed in
a seven week protest in November and December 1944* Beginning with simple
refusals to pay the extra fare the form of resistance became progressively
more elaborate and militant: in 1943 10 000 people marched in a huge
procession the eighteen miles to town and in the following year, the movement
looked at one moment as if i t miggit develop into a township—wide general
strike. Local leadership was provided fcy a Transport Action Committee (later
called a Workers' Transport Action Committee) and from I943 local leadership
II
was supported and advised by an Bnergeney Transport Committee established
and led lay Senator Basner. "By 1943 the CPSA, weakened locally the year
"before "by the expulsion of the merourial Oaur Radebe for petty bourgeois
behaviour (money-lending), was just one of several politioal groups
jostling aorimoniusly with each other for influence over the boyootters.
The genesis of these groups and the intricacies of their relationship with
each other and with the boycotters are matters which have only partly
been uncovered "by recent scholarship but i t does appear that in the
1944 boycott the CPSA functioned to limit and define the oourse of the
movement; in other words that i t s influence was a restraining one- I t
opposed for example (on quite practical grounds) the extension of the
boycott movement to the south-western townships and pressed for the
acceptance of the offer of a City Council subsidised coupon scheme which
guaranteed the perpetuation of the old low fare for three months (77),
and i t may have, through i t s influence on trade unions, delayed the
implementation of the general strike call . In all this the CPSA may well
have been correct in interpreting the popular mood in addition to the
potential limits of what may have been gained. I t i s worth recording, though,
that in doing so they were opposed lay left wing groups calling for a
socialised form of public transport (78). Local communists probably
considered such proposals wildly quixotiot in the wake of the boycott
the Alexandra branch immersed itself in the more everyday preoccupations
of i t s constituents. In July they announoed from their new office in
the old Health Committee rooms their intention of taking steps '"to organise
people around the issue of drains and the risk of small pox*. Hhey also
proposed to raise with the municipality the legal question of the status
of the Health Committee; they anted i t to have trading r i ^ t s so i t could
embark on a programme of bulk buying for consumer cooperatives (79).
Bit if communists accurately gauged the limits to popular militancy
in the Alexandra bus boycott this cannot be said in their judgements
concerning the Orlando squatters movement. At the beginning of the war
each of Orlando rs 5 000 houses accomodated seven people. Oiis average
was to nearly double between 1940 and 1944 as a ooxfcsequence of a huge
influx of migrants from the farms and the reserves seeking access to
jobs and food. Rather than building accommodation for these people
the Council lifted restrictions on subletting and allowed the most
acute conditions of overcrowding. After fruitless agitation against the
housing shortage a group of Orlando residents led by James Sofasonke
Hpanza, an Advisory Board member, organised am exodus mo f sub-tenants out
of the? location to oonstruot hessian shelters on the empty veldt in
March 1944* Before the sub-tenants moved however, Mpan-za approached the
Communists and asked them to join his committee. Mofutsanyane and his
comrades held back, though, arguing that at the beginning of the winter
Npanza's plan; was irresponsible
 a
n<
* would merely lead to greater privations
than already existed. Orlando oommunists distrusted Mpaaaa in any case, with
his background of convicted murderer, "born-again evangelist and small-
time huckster, and they had been energetically opposing his role in
Advisory Board politics for nearly a decade. But municipal hostility and
cold weather notwithstanding, Mpaaza's movement grew and grudgingly the
Communists had to concede support while questioning Mpanza's personal
motives and criticising his administration. Bieir ini t ia l abstention
cost them dear. Thereafter Mpanza ensured their exclusion from any
active participation in the leadership of his new kingdom and they were
oonfined to organising soup kitchens and lobbying the Council in concert
with liberal pressure groups for a more generous policy towards the
squatters. In three successive Board elections, in 1944, 1945 and 1946,
the Communists failed to win any of the seats(8O).
At one level the failure can be attributed to the personalities involved*
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autocratic Mpanza was indisposed to sharing decisions with any "but
the most sycophantic counsel and in manner and style was light years
apart from trained party functionaries like Mofutsanyana. But the
problem was deeper than this for the Communists had underestimated the
housing crisis (si) and the intensity of popular feeling arising from
i t and had allowed the iniative to pass from their hands. As the
Johannesburg District Committee put i t in a refreshingly self-critical
report:.
We failed to recognise the deep desire and need of the
people for vigorous and correct political leadership, we
did not act as the vanguard of their struggles. (82)
Iheir characterisation of Mpanza as1 irresponsible1 was symptomatic of
their unwillingness at that time to contemplate initiating direct action.
In Orlando this may have "been partly a consequence, of participation in
local elections, Though at the beginning the Communists professed to
be conscious of the limited ut i l i ty of the Boards by the 1940s i t is
possible that 'control1 of the Boards had become an end in itself.
Certainly in Orlando in I9.44 the Communists demonstrated considerable
insensitivity to the needs and aspirations of subtenants who were not,
i t should be remembered, entitled to vote in Board elections. It is
also conceivable tnat Johannesburg Communists may have been influenced
in their response to the squatters by their understanding of looal
tfhite politics • Aa the report quoted above went on to suggest:
Oiere is a large and growing body of European opinion
conscious of the oppression of the non-European people
and sympathetic to their demands and aspirations. I t i s
the special duty of every European Communist devotedly and
energetically to spread and deepen this consciousness and
sympathy (83).
Fortunately the kind of looal challenge provided by Hpanza was exceptional
Elsewhere.. . Communist participation in looal bodies suoh as residents
associations and Advisory Boards provided useful vehicles for agitation
over administrative injustices, food shortages and material hardship, and
helped to significantly extend their influence* % 1945 there were
Communist branches or groups established within African communities in
most of the industrial towns (84). Both locally and nationally African
Communists took pains to collaborate with the African National Congress
often functioning as key office holders. Here their tactical emphasis on
reformist demands and their apparent concern to avoid confrontation with
authority helped to foster the developing alliance with the stilli very
conservative ANC leadership* At the same time small-scale organisation
around subsistence issues could also provide the first vital steps in
conununal mobilisation. In this context the food buying cooperatives
developed by Communists in Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria in the course
of 1943 and 1944 were imaginative responses to the deprivation and helpless-
ness of the urban poor (85)- In general then, despite their setback in
Orlando, the early 1940s were years in which the Communists successfully
established themselves as a popular force in local urban'African politics (86).
3heir record was less impressive in the countryside. For in the Reserves
the c&ose of the 1930s and the beginning of the I94OS witnessed the inception
of an extended and increasingly violent struggle as peasants attempted to
resist the government's efforts to reorganise land usage and political
structures. Borou i^ the heroic efforts of Alphaeus Maliba, the Communists
had first hand knowledge of the most serious of these conflicts, that of
the Northern Transvaal, and for a time the Party helped Maliba1 s Zoutpansberg
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Cultural Association, providing legal assistance, an office, and in
1939 publishing a pamphlet "by him (87). But despite resolutions and
the adoption of an agrarian element itt their programme (88), Maliba's
cause did not figure prominently in the Partyfs wartime conoerns-
Indeed when the CpSA in 1944 held i t s first 'rural conference1, marking,
according to Kotane, a 'new stage1 in the Party's development, i t held
i t in the Western Gape for the "benefit of farm la*bourers, not peasants (89).
Of course reaching reserve communities was often very difficult "because
of government restrictions "but i t was also the case that leading
Transvaal Communists felt that the Party's prime tasks should "be
different. As the Pretoria advocate George Pindley commented after
defending Kaliba in Louis Irichardt in I94I5
The Platteland Africans are a secondary area - mere
propaganda i s needed there, not peasant nevolts. (90)
Hie final dimension of CPSA activity was trade union organisation.
While fighting a rearguard action within the white trade union movement (91),
the most important activity was in developing workers' organisations
among Africans and, in the Cape and Natal, among Coloured people and
Indians. CPSA trade union initiatives will "be described at length in a
seperate paper and only a tentative outline of an analysis can be
presented here.
The Second World War provided a favourable climate for the growth of
"black trade unionism. The development of manufacturing and the increasing
employment of Africans in semi-skilled industrial positions provided one
vital impetus for trade union organisation. The inclusion of Afrioans in
Wage Board determinations to a greater extent than ever before gave
to unions legal space for manoeuvre enabling them to deliver substantial
benefit* to their new members without bringing them into immediate
confrontation with the state. A high level of spontaneous industrial
militancy throughout the war years helped to encourage an official
perception of African trade unions as a means through which conflict
between employers and workforce could be regulated.
Communists were not f i rs t in the field in wartime African unionism
(though they did do pioneering work with Indian and Coloured workers in
Durban and the Cape Boland). After the depredations of the purges
and the Popular Frontism of the 1930s they had retained few members
with any experience of African trade unionism- The two clusters of
African trade unions which had developed by 1941, the Joint Committee of
of African Trade Unions, and the Coordinating Committee, with respectively
20 000 and 3 000 affiliated members were led by men who were wary of
involvement with the Communist Party. The f i rs t had been set up as a
result of the work of Max Gordon, a radical socialist employed by the
Institute of Race Relations and the second was under the aegis of
Gana Makabeni, expelled from the Party in I93I (92). Communists, though,
were aotive as members and office bearers in unions affiliated to these
bodies and their merger into a Council of Non-European Trade unions at
the end of 1941 took place at a meeting over which Moses Kotane presided.
At least four of the seven men who composed the first CNETU. executive
were communists. Nevertheless CNETU is best understood as an uneasy
coalition rather than a body over which the Communist Party exercised
direct control.
The main thrust of Communist Party trade union work lay in the expansion
of organisation mainly in the service sector and light industry though
there were efforts to organise power workers, metal workers and mine
labourers as well. Much of the organisation was of a fairly superficial
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quality with Afrioan officials serving as secretaries for several
different organisations and offices centralised on party premises
in Johannesburg. For the purpose of representing workers at wage
"board enquiries such arrangements were adequate but they would have
teen severely put to test in more militant forms of action. The Party
however made i t quite clear on several occasions that i t opposed the
use of the strike weapon. As Ray Alexander reported to the 1944 CPSA
conference:
Our party's policy is directed towaids a peaceful settlement
of disputes and avoiding any strikes or any actions that will
hinder the war effort. (93)
QJiere were pro"bably other considerations as well. As a contemporary
literal commentary pointed out in 1941 s 'Unions have endeavoured to
avoid strike action as far as possible. I t is illegal for Natives to
strike and there is therefore a need for a hifiji degree of organisation'(?4)
Not that workers were unwilling? on several occasions unions had to
curt the militancy of their members. For example in the Non-European
Federation of Iron and Steel Workers i t was neccessary in 1943 to
pass two resolutions against 'hasty,ill considered action1 and
'unneccessary stoppages' after the granting of a modest wage award
and reports of disatisfaction among rank and file workers with the
leadership persisted to the end of the war (95). She Communist-led
Gas and Power Workers' Union intervened in 1942 to prevent a strike
••because we felt that i t was our duty to prevent trouble when the
country was in. the midst of a serious war crisis ' (96)• In at least
three strikes ia which trade unions were involved, the milling workers',
timber workers' and coal deliverers' disputes, all in I944, the
Communists were sharply oritical, accusing their leaders of being 'a
handful of wreckers1,'fifth columnists1 and 'scoundrels' (97). More
specifically in each case they argued that the strikes were based on
inadequate preparation. These unions were led by Irotskyites who delimited
in irri tating the Communists as on the occasion in 1943 when the African
Commercial and Distributive Workers attempted to persuade the Trades and
Labour Council to resolve against the opening of a second front
contending that i t would 'be used only for the imperialists' dream of
crushing the people's movement'. Such a position, oharged the Communists,
was dearly 'Fascist inspired', raising the 'suspicion in the workers'
minds that the Soviet Union's allies are really her enemies' (98). In
the case of strikes which wera not Tbrotskyite inspired the CPSA took
a more sympathetic position, Party members despite policy appearing on
picket lines (99), and the Party itself defending the strikers in i t s
propaganda for African trade union reco^iition. (100).
African trade unionism by 1945 represented a substantial achievement, the
119 bodies with their alleged 150 000 membership (101) representing an
impressive total, particularly it the very small number of trade union
organisers i s recalled. What i s arguable i s that more could have been
achieved, especially if the Party had been willing to employ strikes in i t s
campaign for trade union recognition. In 1945 i t s policy of industrial
discipline appeared as if i t might place in jeopardy i t s ascendency within
the African trade union movement. Accusing the 'Stalinists ' of 'Trade
Union Fetishism'(102) a Trotskyite •Progressive Trade Union Group1
produced a catalogue of the various wrongdoings and shortcomings of the
CNETU executive. These included i t alleged communist inspired 'pacification'
of workers and the establishment of rivals to unions which did not
conform with communist policies and the failure to support strikes (1O3>
In August 1945 Communists needed the help of unaccustomed allies to
retain their position at the CNEIU conference: a well organised effort
by the Progressive Trade Unionists to pack the conference was
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defeated with the help of the CPSA's normal antagonist, Senator Basner,
who had "been invited to open the meeting, thereafter the T^otskyites
were expelled (104), Taking with them some of the most militant and
experienced trade unionists their departure did not portend well for
the new phase of working class action which was to succeed the ending
of the common front against Fascism.
Conclusion
The Party's view of i t s history during this period is one which depicts
i t in terms of unmixed achievement, stressing the succesful "broadening
of public; support, the more militant of i t s activities, and the develop-
ment of mutual perception and understanding "between i t and the African
National Congress, In the one scholarly study of the CPSA wartime
history the author reflects the CPSA's own interpretation in his own
analysis of the CPSA's apparently smooth and logical progression from
a purist advocacy of 'class struggle1 to a more pragmatic espousal
of 'national liberation1. (105).
As the evidence in this paper indicates things were more complicated
than this. This period of the Party's history was characterised "by
i t s lack of militancy, i t s identification with African national
aspirations was "based on a most limited interpretation of what they
should "be, and an optimism that went well beyond most liberal prognostic-
ations of the capacity of white society to seriously entertain proposals
for social reform (106).
Critics of the CPSA both at the time and more recently have suggested
that by allegedly subordinating local interests to the dictates of
international politics (and in particular the Soviet Union1 s role
within them) important opportunities were squandered. Important forces
within ruling circles favoured reforms; with more militant actions
these would have been secured (107),
Of course- i t i s also possible that popular militancy may have increased
government intransigenoy particularly as the Communists and other
opposition groups were s t i l l very weak organisations. Even the new
Afrioan labour movement was hi^ily vulnerable: mostly unskilled, predom-
inant ly in non-strategic industries, internally divided, and operating
in a context of hi^i urban unemployment was i t really capable of
deleivering really decisive blows against employers and the state?
Uier CPSA's left-wing opponents in the trade union movement were contempt^
uous <Pf the Jmilk and water1 methods employed by the'CPSA in i t s
for Africon- trade union record tion "but their own strike actions were
entirely confined' to wage—related issues (108).
It may be more tenable, though, to argue that the CPSA's role during
the war was as much a reflection of the experience and predisposition
of i t s members as a consequence of externally imposed diktats. *There
were those, like the lawyer HVanz Boshoff, suspended from the Party
for accepting a state brief to act against Mpanza, who were s t i l l
captives of their professional and social background (109). O&en
there were others, such as the veterans of the Jewish Workers1 Club,
who were representatives of a stream of Eastern European, radicalism.
For them identification with the needs of the Soviet workers1 state
required no external prompting (no ) . Some black men joined the Party
because i t stood for, in the words of Naboth Mokgatle, Pretoria
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trade unionist, a society *in which al l children would have free
education and equal opportunities . . . (and) . . .a l l would have the ^
to vote r (m) # Some of the Party's wartime adherents would" have joined from a
humanitarian impulse* towards justice and equity rather than a knowledgaTale
commitment to Marxism (112). She CPSA of the 1940s represented a rich
composite of South African political traditions. The one thing i t was
not was a Leninist vanguard of professional revolutionaries. I t i s not
surprising, therefore, that i t did not behave like one.
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